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1.1 Method and Analysis: Classification
 In one of the most intense moments of Arthur Miller’s Death of 
a Salesman, a broken down salesman, Willy Loman, is at his wit’s end 
trying to convince his son of an impossible falsehood. Their lives stand to 
be altered forever as Willy commands, “Now stop crying and do as I say. 
I gave you an order. Biff, I gave you an order! Is that what you do when 
I give you an order? How dare you cry!” (A. Miller 120) The playwright’s 
stage directions even insist that Willy Loman is “assuming command”; 
it seems to be a directive, an order, with layers of meaning and emo-
tion, but can it really be? To truly be a command it must necessarily be 
a “speech act,” a thing “done with words”; However, J. L. Austin, the 
innovator who first defined the theory of speech acts in the seminal work 
on the subject, How to Do Things with Words, set up a conundrum: “a 
performative utterance will […] be in a peculiar way hollow or void if 
said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in a 
soliloquy” (Austin 22; emphasis original). The questions must be cleared 
up as to whether or not a character in literature can indeed indulge in 
speech acts and, if so, what role those speech acts play in literature. I 
argue that the importance of speech acts performed by literary characters 
is that they are not only real and possible, but necessary and supremely 
relevant within the bounds of their context.
To analyze literary speech acts, I use a system innovated by Austin him-
self which was later refined by Searle, a philosopher and a noted pioneer 
in linguistics. Austin provided a tentative list of general classes of speech 
acts. He believed that his list was not exhaustive and that some speech 
acts may fit in multiple classes. His main interest was that his class sys-
tem be useful (Austin 149-50). The general classes that Austin identified 
were verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives. 
Austin defined these classes by listing a few examples and devoting a 
paragraph to the way his examples were related to the labels (Austin 150-
162). As Austin had expected, others have gone on to create more inclu-
sive, better defined classes for use with speech act theory.
 In revising the classifications, Searle disagreed with Austin on 
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several points. Where Austin saw an infinite range of possibilities for 
speech acts, Searle supposed that “No one […] would say that there are 
countless kinds of economic systems or marital arrangements or sorts 
of political parties; why should language be more taxonomically recalci-
trant than any other aspect of human social life?” (Searle vii)  Instead, he 
believed that there must be a finite body of possible ways to use language, 
and that body could be divided thoroughly into the parts it comprises: 
“There are not […] an infinite or indefinite number of language games 
or uses of language. Rather, the illusion of limitless uses of language is 
engendered by an enormous unclarity about what constitutes the criteria 
for delimiting one language game or use of language from another” (Sear-
le 29). This assessment led him to an efficient summary of the “things we 
do” with language; namely, we “tell people how things are (Assertives), 
we try to get them to do things (Directives), we commit ourselves to do-
ing things (Commissives), we express our feelings and attitudes (Expres-
sives), and we bring about changes in the world through our utterances 
(Declarations)” (Searle viii). Since I have not been able to find a speech 
act that Searle’s list does not accommodate, I will use his labels when I 
find it necessary to characterize a speech act to point out what is being 
done with words.
1.2 Method and Analysis: Constative-Performative Implied Acts
Austin starts his lectures off with a curious hedge, saying, “What I shall 
have to say here is neither difficult nor contentious; the only merit I 
should like to claim for it is that of being true, at least in parts” (Austin 
1). That final phrase in particular, “at least in parts,” inspires inquiry; 
it implies that what he has to say may be false in parts. He could have 
meant to say something else entirely. Maybe it is only a hedging modesty, 
but it could imply something greatly more important: that some of what 
he says can be classified neither as true or false, but instead as felicitous 
or infelicitous, which, as I will discuss in detail later, is the most eminent 
defining characteristic of a speech act.
J.H. Miller, an active modern linguistics scholar, examined Austin’s 
opening as well and concluded, “Austin claims that he has at least in 
parts spoken the truth about the distinction between performatives and 
constatives. He invites the reader to measure the worth of the book by its 
truth value and perhaps dares the reader to tell the true from the false” 
(J. H. Miller 22). But if Austin is really only inviting the reader to tell the 
true from the felicitous, and not the false at all, then he may be pointing 
out that he sees that there is a mix of performative and constative in his 
work, especially given all of the examples of performatives in it. Further-
more, the book performs something as a whole; it reveals, calls attention, 
names things, etc. Austin suggested that:
at least in some ways there is danger of our initial and tentative distinc-
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tion between constative and performative breaking down.
 We may, however, fortify ourselves in the conviction that the 
distinction is a final one by reverting to the old idea that the constative 
utterance is true or false and the performative is happy or unhappy. (54)
Nonetheless, important caveats of the issue remain unexplored in How to 
Do Things with Words. Phrases exist that seem only to describe a situ-
ation, at the logical form, but which indeed have a force of action in a 
performative sense. Such phrases can be found in Death of a Salesman:
(1) CHARLEY: It was my ace (A. Miller 46)
When Charley says sentence (1) at a contentious moment during a card 
game with Willy, he is logically only describing the situation as he under-
stands it. He adds, for emphasis, “for God’s sake!” which does nothing to 
alter the logical meaning. But there is a speech act embedded in (1). It is 
an assertive-directive challenge; Charley wants Willy to admit his trans-
gression of the rules of the game. Example (1) has both constative and the 
performative faces. A constative is either true or false, and a performative 
is either successful or unsuccessful. Example (1) fits both descriptions 
since either the ace was Charley’s or it was not, true or false, but Charley 
is definitely trying to solicit a reaction from Willy. By stating how things 
are (an assertive) he is telling Willy to relent (a directive). And that at-
tempt shall either be successful or unsuccessful. As it turns out, Willy 
does not relent; however, even though Charley is unsuccessful in his at-
tempt, the fact that (1) can be measured in terms of success shows that it 
is, at least in part, performative, much as Austin’s book is, at least in part, 
true.
 Perhaps the issue regarding literary speech act analysis arose 
because literature is not fully understood in many ways and therefore 
ineligible, in some eyes, for scientific study. As Sandy Petrey, a pioneer 
in literary speech acts analysis, concluded, “theory and theorist disagree 
over what literature is and does. The imperative to socialize that erases 
the dividing line between constative and performative also erases that be-
tween literary and performative” (Petrey 50-51). In Speech Acts and Lit-
erary Theory, Petrey broadens the discussion of the constative performa-
tive glide, saying, “the constative/performative distinction dies because 
both its terms encompass language and society at once. Identifying the 
constative as a performative proclaims language’s social identity perhaps 
more spectacularly than discovering the performative in the first place” 
(42). To Petrey, the distinction dies because societal pressure destroys it; 
social interactions cannot be purely constative, true or false.
The purity of a true or false statement can’t survive the social pressure to 
derive action. She argues that the speech acts analyst must broaden her 
perspective to include apparently constative utterances since “form alone 
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cannot establish linguistic force. Society must come in when force is at 
issue, and with literature it certainly is” (Petrey 51). (1) above is just one 
of a multitude of possible examples of the constative sheep’s clothing that 
a performative can don. An example of a more successful performative is:
  (2) BIFF: He wouldn’t listen to you (A. Miller 120).
This statement is both assertive and expressive, and assertives always 
have the overlay of a constative because they “tell people how things are” 
(Searle viii). It asserts that the math teacher would not listen to Willy, 
and in Biff’s eyes that is true—how the world has become. However, it 
furthermore expresses Biff’s profound disappointment with Willy. What 
it does is to reveal the forever-changed view Biff holds of Willy. While it 
doesn’t seem like such a pivotal action on the surface, it is actually the 
first time in Biff’s life that he has lost faith in his dad. And that change, 
that realization and disappointment, characterizes Biff’s relationship 
with Willy until the day Willy dies. 
Earlier in his life, Willy was the source of Biff’s confidence:
  WILLY: You nervous, Biff, about the game?
  BIFF: Not if you’re gonna be there. (A. Miller 31)
Biff drew confidence from Willy’s presence before. He “missed” Willy 
“every minute” that he was gone (A. Miller 30). And Willy’s philosophy 
rolled from Biff’s tongue in respectful imitation:
WILLY: Charley is not—liked. He’s liked, but he’s not—well liked. (A. 
Miller 30).
WILLY: Bernard is not well liked, is he?
BIFF: He’s liked, but he’s not well liked. (A. Miller 33)
From the time Biff states (2) until the day Willy dies, the change in Biff 
first represented in (2) sets him on a restless course to wander without 
happiness, confidence, or a sense of meaning in his life, constantly trying 
to redefine himself on his own terms, or trying to, as his mother Linda 
puts it, “find himself,” (A. Miller 16). (2) redefines both father and son.
Finally, I will put the constative/performative distinction to rest because 
the study of utterances that are constative on the surface can be stud-
ied for their performative capacity productively. Valuable surmises can 
be drawn from the analysis of mixed constative-performatives, just as 
valuable and informative results can be derived, for example, through 
Newtonian physics, though it has been supplanted by Einsteinian phys-
ics. And when Einsteinian physics give way to something that describes 
the universe more thoroughly, Einstein’s model will likely still be used 
to demonstrate points that the new theory convolutes. The theory that 
constative and performative are mixed is productive, and that is merit 
enough by itself. Not only do I see the distinction to be quite blurry, but 
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there is also much to be gained by analysis of constative-performative 
utterances.
1.2 Method and Analysis: Context
 As an author Arthur Miller wields an incredible power through 
his words. He is a creator of worlds. Miller does something very real, in 
the Lomans’ world, without even a word uttered on stage. The German 
philosopher Max Picard once wrote “Speech came out of silence, out of 
the fullness of silence. The fullness of silence would have exploded if it 
had not been able to flow out into speech. . . . There is something silent 
in every word, as an abiding token of the origin of speech. And in every 
silence there is something of the spoken word, as an abiding token of 
the power of silence to create speech” (Picard qtd. in Clair 3). In creating 
the world of Death of a Salesman, Arthur Miller was demonstrating the 
latent power in the “fullness of silence”; the play opens with a long set of 
stage directions. Without them, there is no setting, no person of Willy Lo-
man, no space for the actions to take place in. Miller writes, “A melody is 
heard, played upon a flute. It is small and fine, telling of grass and trees 
and the horizon” (A. Miller 11). With that, the silence breaks into music. 
For nearly two full pages nothing will be said at all. “Before us is the 
Salesman’s house. We are aware of towering, angular shapes behind it, 
surrounding it on all sides,” Miller’s stage directions continue, “Only the 
blue light of the sky falls upon the house and forestage; the surrounding 
area shows an angry orange” (A. Miller 11). On and on, things appear. 
Miller is doing something with words: creating a world, peopling it, giv-
ing context to his story. In that way, silence begets speech. Miller is creat-
ing context.
  In the real world, context for discourse requires no one’s special 
act of creation. In fact it is, as Searle notes, impossible to remove all con-
text:
I argue against the theory that the literal meaning of a sentence can be 
construed as the meaning that it has apart from any context whatever, 
the meaning that it has in the so called ‘null context’. Against this view I 
contend that the notion of literal meaning only has application against 
a background of assumptions and practices which are not themselves 
represented as part of literal meaning. (Searle xi)
He notes that context is made of assumptions and practices. The speaker, 
hearer, and audience unconsciously hold many of those assumptions as 
part of their individual representations of the world. Context comes to 
bear pragmatically, reaching outside of the restraints of the discourse 
itself and its language. As noted linguist Diane Blakemore explains, “the 
fundamental ability in communication is not linguistic encoding and 
decoding, but the ability to derive inferences which result in assumptions 
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which are entertained as metarepresentations of other people’s thoughts, 
desires and intentions” (Blakemore 71). In Death of a Salesman, Ar-
thur Miller does not attempt only to create a dialogue that explains his 
characters, their motivations, and their relationships; he creates an entire 
situational context. The audience is intended to extrapolate the meaning 
not only through the dialogue, but also through the circumstances that 
have led to the activities the characters indulge in. All of these smaller 
acts add up to a main theme. The play is, overall, a tragedy that investi-
gates the depression and suicide of a common man. All of the instances 
that I undertake to examine in this essay are related to that main theme 
in some way and form an interactive context with it.
 Every great literary work is a mystery, whether the mystery is 
who committed a crime or, less blatantly, what makes the characters tick. 
The circumstances of the mystery in Death of a Salesman come together 
to create a pivotal moment that takes place in Boston. There are refer-
ences to Willy Loman’s trips to Boston throughout the play, and the 
tension between Biff and Willy has its roots there. Biff’s admiration of his 
father is well established in his youth. He imitates Willy and takes on his 
philosophies, as shown above with “well liked” (30-3). Biff lives to make 
his father proud and thrives on his attention, which is shown in his need 
for Willy’s support at the upcoming football game (31). But all of that 
changes when Biff, having failed his math class, races to Boston to solicit 
his father’s help in asking the teacher to change the grade (116-121). 
Arthur Miller demonstrates this scene to the audience as Willy’s dream-
like memory. Willy remembers being with a woman in his hotel room 
when Biff arrived. As the action unfolds, Biff finds that she has been 
hiding in the bathroom, and he is crushed. That context is the impetus 
for the strain in their father-son relationship and drives all of the actions, 
including speech acts, that transpire between them from then forward.
 The analyst (and perhaps the audience) must understand the way 
the utterances relate the actions in the play to the theme that comprises 
them. But the characters must “comprehend”1∗ in a different way; they 
must relate the dialogue to their “lives”* and personal “experiences.”* The 
characters need not “feel”* that a theme is being pursued, in a literary 
sense; they need only understand the relevance of each passing utterance 
and action to their current situation. Blakemore explained this idea, say-
ing, “the inferential process involved in utterance interpretation may in-
volve assumptions about temporal or causal relationships between events 
in the world or about relationships between the speaker and hearer. 
However, within a relevance theoretic framework, these assumptions are 
not construed as assumptions about relationships in the discourse or the 
1 ∗ I bracket comprehend, lives, experience(s), etc. with quotes since characters 
don’t technically have lives, experiences or comprehensions but only represent them 
through the lens of authorship.
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text itself” (157). Assumptions that come to bear on the discourse may 
reach far beyond the actual discourse itself into the characters’ “experi-
ence.” These assumptions are brought to attention, in general, by the 
process of “Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator 
produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator 
and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, 
to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions 
{I}” (Sperber & Wilson 63). Audience here means the character receiving 
the communication, not the audience of a play, since this theory gener-
ally applies to natural language, not literature. However, a playwright 
must use stage directions to incorporate this type of communication into 
a situation in a script since the stimulus is often an action rather than 
dialogue. Not only must the characters “understand” ostensive communi-
cation, but the audience must also be able to understand it for their own 
comprehension and be able to understand the relevance of the ostensive 
communication to the characters’ comprehension. In Dreath of a Sales-
man, Biff accomplishes this kind of communication when he cries (120). 
The fact that he cries has all of the hallmarks of a speech act, except for 
the first, a locution. It has a perlocution, an effect on Willy, who reacts, 
“How dare you cry!” and then softens, puts his arm around Biff, and at-
tempts to tell him that his infidelity is not as important as it seems (120). 
It has illocution in that Biff intends his father to know his feelings, but 
the locutionary act is neither truly a locution, only an action, nor vol-
untary. Context in this form not only lends meaning to the speech acts 
surrounding it, but borders on becoming a speech act or something like it 
in itself.
 A playwright can use ostensive communication to manipulate the 
audience’s cognitive environment as well. The writer can either show the 
audience what she believes to be relevant for the audience’s understand-
ing, or she can withhold information from the audience to alter the audi-
ence’s cognitive environment by controlling what ideas are manifest to 
her audience: “What is manifest in Sperber and Wilson’s terms, is what 
to an individual is situationally recognizable, comprising the actual and 
potential impingements of the physical environment on their cognitive 
environment (the latter will include knowledge and memory)” (Toolan 
184). Miller plays with character knowledge and memory by hiding the 
incident in Boston and all that it manifests until page 116, though the 
incident happened several years before the time frame of the play and 
Willy’s daydream which reveals it. In it, the presence of The Woman, the 
new stockings, and Biff’s tears, among other things, will add to the audi-
ence’s cognitive environment, which is precisely what Miller exploits, by 
hiding it until late in the play, to create the mystery. Had Miller told the 
story in a more linear fashion, showing Biff’s younger days in the earli-
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est scenes, followed hard upon by the incident in Boston, the mystery 
would have been far less significant; the audience would only be waiting 
to see how the characters reacted to it rather than involved in trying to 
understand the relationship between Biff and Willy and wondering how it 
could have gotten to its dilapidated state.
 In order to alter the audience’s cognitive environment, the 
author must have what Schultz calls the “capacity for entertaining a 
multiplicity of views of the world (and of ourselves), without thereby suf-
fering irreparable mental breakdown,” which is “at the root of the versa-
tility, flexibility, adaptability that makes us human beings, rather than 
automata” (Schultz 117). The ability to comprehend in this way is not 
unique to authors, but it is a tool that authors must use in a different way 
than ordinary language users. Whereas humans must ordinarily be able 
to understand the way that others perceive their world to understand 
another person’s perspective, authors must create the world and invent 
the different perspectives that the characters experience. An author uses 
this understanding of multiple perspectives in order to create conflict. 
Toolan argues that cognitive effect theory can be useful without assuming 
a shared cognitive environment (184). Characters may have independent 
cognitive environments which only share certain things in common, not 
an entire shared environment. If Biff’s assumptions perfectly matched 
Willy’s, there would be no loss of respect and no real conflict. This is the 
situation Willy is hoping for when he tells Biff “Now look, Biff, when you 
grow up you’ll understand about these things. You mustn’t—you mustn’t 
overemphasize a thing like this” (A. Miller 120). It is the violation of Biff’s 
expectations, embodied in his assumptions about Willy prior to the Bos-
ton incident (his belief in Willy as a father and a husband to his mother) 
that drives the intrigue.
In the scene mentioned above, much of the interpretation relies on the 
context surrounding (2), “He wouldn’t listen to you” (A. Miller 120), 
which all by itself, says nothing of the serious inferences that I have 
drawn from it. Context gives meaning to speech acts—especially indi-
rect speech acts. Searle asserts that indirection can be used to perform 
a speech act unrelated to the direct meaning of a phrase (Searle 33); 
instead of directly rejecting an invitation to dinner, a person can reply 
that she has to wash her hair. Though the statement is in no way directly 
related to the invitation, the hearer will almost infallibly understand the 
implication. Drawing heavily on Grice, Blakemore shows that non-truth 
conditional meaning can be derived from implicature (13). Furthermore, 
she makes a case for “a theory of pragmatic competence whose domain 
includes the role of context and general pragmatic principles in the inter-
pretation of utterances and for a theory of linguistic pragmatic compe-
tence whose domain includes the role that certain […] expressions play in 
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the interpretation of the utterances that contain them” (Blakemore 14). 
Her theory relates context to linguistic meaning, which is just why the 
playwright must create the circumstances surrounding Biff’s emotional 
departure to demonstrate the impetus for his emotional disjunction from 
Willy.
In that scene discussed, Biff is not reacting to something said, but to 
something that he learns about his father by seeing and experiencing 
it. He learns, by The Woman’s presence in Willy’s hotel room, that his 
father is a “liar” and a “fake” (A. Miller 121). This realization results from 
ostensive, not linguistic, input:
Willy laughs and The Woman joins in offstage.
WILLY, without hesitation: Hurry downstairs and—
BIFF: Somebody in there?
WILLY: No, that was next door.
The Woman laughs offstage. (A. Miller 118)
Biff’s suspicions arise from hearing The Woman’s laughter and from 
what he senses in Willy’s reaction to the laughter. But he has not yet as-
similated the information:
BIFF: Somebody got into your bathroom!
WILLY: No, it’s the next room, there’s a party—
THE WOMAN, enters, laughing […]: Can I come in? There’s something 
in the bathtub, Willy, and it’s moving!
Willy looks at Biff, who is staring open-mouthed and horrified at The 
Woman.(A. Miller 119)
In this scene, none of the spoken words reveal anything to Biff to make 
him “horrified.” His life has been changed by what he sees, the context 
that leads to Willy’s resulting speech acts, a series of lies.
 Willy’s first lie is already out, “No, it’s in the next room, there’s a 
party,” an assertive speech act meant to change Biff’s cognitive environ-
ment. Willy is attempting to change the way Biff uses the information he 
is gaining. He follows that lie with “Ah—you better go back to your room. 
They must be finished painting by now. They’re painting her room so I let 
her take a shower here. Go back, go back…” (119) Of this string of utter-
ances, only one is an outright assertive lie: “They’re painting her room so 
I let her take a shower here.” There are examples of directives as well, in 
“you better go back to your room,” and “Go back, go back.” The Woman 
cannot go back to her room; she probably has no other place in the hotel 
to go. Tragically, for Willy, she either does not pick up on his desire for 
her to take part in his lies, or she does not care to help him to lie. She 
refuses the role that Willy thrusts upon her. He forms that role for her 
not with a specific speech act but with the collection of performatives 
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and constatives he uses. The rest of Willy’s utterances are more heavily 
constative in form, though they are false. These constative-performatives 
falsely describe the world as Willy wants Biff to see it. Willy’s performa-
tives attempt to make others conform to the roles he has chosen for them 
in the false world he is describing.
 Performatives by themselves are only part of the story. In the 
scene above, Willy has used constative-formed utterances to attempt to 
form a false context and to form an overall implied speech act: to assert 
a lie to Biff which would alter Biff’s view of the world in a way that would 
save Willy from the repercussions of his infidelity. Willy’s attempt to cre-
ate a new contextual environment for his speech acts shows that context 
is indeed integral to speech acts, as Searle suggests, and that literary 
works incorporate and rely on this fact to portray a model of reality. The 
context is a part of the performative, not just a part of its description.
1.3 Method and Analysis: Felicity
More importantly than providing context for the play’s themes, the 
character’s dialogue and speech acts rely on context for relevance. Each 
character holds assumptions that make up his or her personal context, 
or personal view of the world, and Sperber and Wilson assert that “An 
assumption is relevant if and only if it has some contextual effect in that 
context” (122). They later relate their theory directly to speech acts, say-
ing, “There are […] a variety of ways in which a description […] can be 
relevant; some will have the effect of an ordinary assertion, others the 
effect of a report of speech or thought, others the effect of an irony or dis-
sociation, others the effect of a speech-act classification and so on” (Sper-
ber & Wilson 249). They list three ways that an assumption can have no 
contextual effects at all, including, “the assumption is inconsistent with 
the context and is too weak to upset it” (121). Willy’s lies do not work on 
Biff. They are infelicitous because the new assumptions presented by 
Willy are inconsistent with the assumptions that Biff already holds and 
are too weak to upset the existing context.
Furthermore, Biff sees Willy’s intention more lucidly than the false con-
text Willy attempts to create. Blakemore’s explanation of relevance seek-
ing may explain this kind of phenomenon: “A hearer […] adopts a strat-
egy which does not involve meta-representing the speakers thoughts:” in 
other words it does not involve creating a personal mental representation 
of what the listener believes the speaker’s thoughts to be; “[S]he simply 
looks for an interpretation that is relevant enough, and on finding it as-
sumes that it is the intended one” (Blakemore 70). Although Blakemore 
is attempting to describe how successful communication works, her 
theory applies because it describes the same process that allows Biff 
to see through Willy’s lies. Biff can see that his father’s assertions are 
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relevant in that their intended effect is to obscure his contextual under-
standing, not to elucidate it. Willy’s speech acts, his lies, throughout his 
interaction with Biff in this scene are infelicitous because he cannot make 
the false context more relevant than the real one. Biff’s assumptions are 
too strong.
Willy is a seducer of sorts as well. He even gives his son this philosophy 
on relationships: “Just wanna be careful with those girls, Biff, that’s 
all. Don’t make any promises. No promises of any kind. Because a girl, 
y’know, they always believe what you tell ‘em” (A. Miller 27). He has 
duped a mistress in Boston, and he entices his wife and children by tell-
ing them what he believes they want to hear, always attempting to modify 
the context to suit his own ends. In this way, his speech compares with 
Felman’s analysis of Molière’s Don Juan’s speech:
Saying, for him, is in no case tantamount to knowing, but rather to do-
ing: acting on the interlocutor, modifying the situation and the interplay 
of forces within it. Language, for Don Juan, is performative and not in-
formative; it is a field of enjoyment, not of knowledge. As such, it cannot 
be qualified as true or false, but rather quite specifically as felicitous or 
infelicitous, successful or unsuccessful. (Felman 27)
Where Don Juan enjoys success, Willy Loman fails. Willy’s speech acts 
are constantly failing due to their reliance on the false context he at-
tempts to build for them.
Throughout the play Willy attempts to sell himself with lies. Starting 
with Willy’s earliest dreamlike memory in the play, he attempts to inspire 
confidence in himself and his boys, saying, “Tell you a secret, boys. Don’t 
breathe it to a soul. Someday I’ll have my own business, and I’ll never 
have to leave home any more” (30). If those were Willy’s plans, then the 
play never shows him trying to follow them. He goes on to exaggerate his 
successes, “America is full of beautiful towns and fine, upstanding people. 
And they know me, boys, they know me up and down New England. The 
finest people. [. . . .] I have friends. I can park my car in any street in New 
England, and the cops protect it like their own” (31). He also tells his wife 
that he’s doing very well in business, saying, “I did five hundred gross in 
Providence and seven hundred gross in Boston” (35). Over the next few 
pages of dialogue Willy’s confidence breaks down and the truth emerges 
when, in her excitement at the professed success, Linda produces a pencil 
and begins to figure their profit. Willy then says, more realistically, “Well, 
I—I did about a hundred eighty gross in Providence. Well, no—it came 
to—roughly two hundred gross on the whole trip” (35). Reality comes 
crashing in on him, and he begins to contradict the lies that he told to 
the boys as well, saying, “You know, the trouble is, Linda, people don’t 
seem to take to me,” and, “I know it when I walk in. They seem to laugh 
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at me. [. . . .] I don’t know the reason for it, but they just pass me by. I’m 
not noticed” (36). Willy’s lies, his assertive speech acts, break down into 
admissions, his expressive speech acts. He flies back and forth between 
self-confidence and defeated depression, the defeat resulting from his 
infelicitous lies. Felicity depends upon “the total speech-act in the total 
speech-situation” (Austin 148). Willy Loman attempts to create, with his 
words, a certain speech situation, a relevant context including a success-
ful version of himself. But he cannot make it real. When reality intrudes 
incongruously with his locutionary inventions, Willy is defeated. His lies 
become infelicitous. He ultimately fails because the context he attempts 
to build gives way to the real context.
2.1 Conclusions
Context comes from both the text and the reader. A reader’s context is 
her entire life experience up to and including the moment of any given 
utterance, but a text’s context is only what is presented in the text, along 
with a finite number of specific references within the text to the real 
world. Those references are only parasitic on the real world, though, and 
are restricted in relevance in that the characters to whom they apply are 
themselves limited to their representation in the text. Literary context 
is restricted, then, in the sense that its referents are mainly accessible 
within the text itself and that the text is finite. Instances of any real-world 
referents are also finite, in number at least, since a given literary work 
represents only what is said within its own confines; it represents only 
the real-world referents that are included in or alluded to in that text, 
whereas natural language has no restriction on referents, its context 
being the real world and the entire experience of all participants. Also, 
natural language is created in real time, making the context open-ended 
since possible referents during discourse creation are limitless. The 
advantages of this can be seen in that, in natural language analysis, it is 
customary to record in some way the utterances to be analyzed thereby 
rendering them more similar to literature so that they can be thoroughly 
studied. In literary analysis, the context can be studied to the most thor-
ough degree possible. Only the context of the audience’s experience and 
personal reaction to speech acts is beyond the scope of analysis.
What speech acts accomplish in the characters’ world, evaluated through 
their context, elucidates the perlocutionary effect that the speech acts 
have, including emotional responses not only for characters, but for the 
audience as well. These are derived through context first because context 
is a part of the performative, not just a part of its description. Austin 
said, when speech act theory began, that felicity depended upon “the 
total speech-act in the total speech-situation” (Austin 148); however, I 
have shown that “the total speech-situation” requires a great deal more 
than the simple felicity conditions this is often taken to describe. “The 
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total speech-situation” is not simply a set of roles to be played under the 
appropriate circumstances. It is every relevant action and every relevant 
thing that is seen, heard, or otherwise sensed by the participants in a 
dialogue. “The total speech-situation” is the history and attitudes of every 
participant as well. Context is not just part of the description of a speech 
act; it is much of the driving force behind a speech act.
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